(结对认亲活动) 
Under this initiative, which was launched by Chen Quanguo in October 2016, more than a million party cadres, government officials and managers at state-owned companies are required to integrate themselves into the daily lives of Uyghur or other minority families in Xinjiang, creating fictitious bonds like close relatives. In practice, the Becoming Family Initiative is an extension of and has merged with the Fanghuiju program, and officials are required to spy on their ‘relatives’ and help with their ‘transformation’.

Becoming Family Initiative

(便民警务站) 
Street-corner police billets established throughout Xinjiang in late 2016 as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the party-state system to strengthen surveillance and control mechanisms in the party’s campaign against the ‘three evil forces’ (三股势力).

Convenience police station

(去极端化) 
A term used by party-state officials in Xinjiang to refer to a range of coercive re-education policies, including mass propaganda, extrajudicial detention, birth control measures, labour assignments and surveillance, aimed at ‘eradicating religious extremism’ (去宗教极端化) among Uyghurs and other indigenous communities in the region.

De-extremification

(研判会) 
An extrajudicial meeting of village and neighbourhood committees in Xinjiang (sometimes held daily) to determine, among other matters, what stability maintenance actions are required during the two campaigns, including whether individuals or families should be subjected to greater surveillance or sent away for re-education.

Evaluation meeting

(访惠聚) 
A human surveillance and aid program initiated in Xinjiang in March 2014. The program dispatches thousands of work teams of middle-ranking, chiefly Han, party and government cadres to live and work among indigenous communities where there are concerns over instability. The work teams assist with local governance, including the surveillance and control mechanisms for ‘high-risk’ families and individuals.

Fanghuiju

(计划生育) 
The official term for the Chinese Government’s birth control and limitation policies first introduced in 1979 and remaining in place today despite a loosening of restrictions across China. Ethnic minorities such as the Uyghurs used to enjoy widespread exemptions and preferential births, which were nullified in Xinjiang when the family planning regulations were revised in 2017 as a part of the strike-hard campaign against illegal births.

Family planning

(基层治理) 
Considered the cornerstone of national governance under Xi Jinping and crucial to strengthening and modernising the party’s control, visibility and responsibility at the local levels of society.

Grassroots governance

(社会网格化管理, Grid-style social management) 
A China-wide social control innovation that divides communities into geographical sectors and then hands over responsibility for service provision and stability maintenance to a dedicated team of party-state officials for each sector. It was implemented across Xinjiang beginning in 2012.

Grid management

(违法生育) 
The term used to refer to violations of China’s family planning regulations. In 2017, Xinjiang revised its family planning regulations to eliminate preferential births for Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang, and subsequently launched a strike-hard campaign against ‘illegal births’ with the explicit aim to ‘reduce and stabilise fertility at a moderate level’ and reduce the birthrate in southern Xinjiang.

Illegal births

(一体化联合作战平台, Integrated Joint Operations Platform) 
A mass surveillance and policing app used by security authorities in Xinjiang and managed by the Stability Maintenance Command of the party’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission. The system draws in data from a range of other government systems as well as automated and mass surveillance tools and then pushes out alerts regarding suspicious activities or circumstances so they can be followed up by police and community workers.

IJOP

(劳动力转移) 
The allocation of mandatory state employment outside of one’s home jurisdiction in the name of poverty alleviation. During the two campaigns, Uyghurs and other minorities (in chiefly rural southern Xinjiang) were assigned jobs on farms and factory assembly lines throughout China under conditions that suggest forced labour.

Labour transfer

(人民代表大会) 
China’s rubber-stamp parliament, which is nominally the government’s highest organ of state power. Government ministries report to the congress through the State Council.

National People’s Congress

(社区居民委员会) 
The lowest tier of administrative governance in urban China, which is legally a self-governing and self-elected body created to oversee service provision in the communities but is ultimately controlled by grassroots party officials responsible for also maintaining social stability and harmony in their local jurisdictions.

Neighbourhood Committee

(政法系统) 
The functional party portfolio in charge of China’s domestic coercive apparatuses and its various government departments, such as the police, courts, prosecutors, prisons and secret police. The party’s Political and Legal Affairs Committee oversees this elaborate system of repression, which includes branch offices in each territorial jurisdiction and vertical layers of the bureaucracy.

Political and Legal Affairs System

(扶贫) 
Short for ‘precision-poverty relief’ (精准扶贫): a national program launched by Xi Jinping in 2014 to achieve the party’s first-centenary goal of comprehensively building a ‘moderately prosperous society’ by 2021. In the name of poverty alleviation, Uyghurs and other minority groups in Xinjiang are given compulsory job assignments.

Poverty alleviation

(宣讲) 
Public sessions held across Xinjiang at which a group of speakers warns against the dangers of ‘religious extremism’ (宗教极端化) and declare their gratitude and loyalty to the Party and its policies. These sessions sometimes include denunciation sessions (揭批) and public loyalty pledges known as ‘speak up and brandish the sword’ (发声亮剑).

Propaganda lecture

(教育转化) 
In order to excise what party-state officials termed the ‘malignant tumour’ (毒瘤) of religious extremism in Xinjiang, Uyghurs and other ‘afflicted’ minorities were forced to undergo ‘transformation through education’, or a coercive process of social re-engineering that includes political indoctrination, behaviour and thought disciplining and other acts of ‘de-extremification’ (去极端化).

Re-education

(维稳) 
A frequently used abbreviation for ‘upholding social stability’ (维持稳定): a core focus of the party-state system in the post-1989 era, under which any threats to regime security are dealt with quickly and harshly in order to maintain the existing social order. During the two campaigns in Xinjiang, party-state officials stressed the need to ‘place stability above all else’ (稳定压倒一切).

Stability Maintenance

(严打运动) 
In response to Uyghur-led acts of political violence and resistance, the Chinese Government launched a nation-wide ‘strike hard campaign against violent terrorist activity’ (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) in May 2014. Xinjiang was declared both the front line and main battleground in this campaign, in which ruthless and extraordinary methods were authorised to restore stability across the region.

Strike Hard Campaign

(重点人员) 
Individuals designated by Chinese authorities as potential threats to political, economic or social stability in China. These are individuals or groups that authorities want to control—through surveillance, repression or detention—in order to prevent them from taking deleterious actions in the future.

Targeted person

Targeted people

(三股势力) 
Party officials speak about the “three forces” that pose the biggest threat to national unity and social stability in Xinjiang, being separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism. Sometimes rendered in English as the “Three Evils” or “Three Evil Forces,” this formulation was introduced in 2000 during meetings of the Shanghai Five, a group that evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Three Forces

(领导小组) 
Ad hoc or permanent interagency coordinating committees that comprise representatives from across party, government and paramilitary agencies in China, known officially as ‘leading small groups’.

Taskforce

(三类人员) 
The groups of people in Xinjiang that the Chinese Government claims must undergo re-education: those who participate in extremist activities ‘not serious enough to constitute a crime,’ those whose activities ‘posed a real danger but did not cause actual harm’, and those who served time for terrorism and still pose ‘a potential threat to society’.

Three kinds of people

(三股势力) 
A Chinese formulation adopted at the inaugural Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in 2001 to refer to the threats of extremism, terrorism and separatism globally, with a particular focus on Xinjiang and the ‘“East Turkestan” terrorist organisations’ (‘东突’恐怖组织) in the Chinese context.

Three evil forces

(‘三位一体’工作机制) 
A governance tool pioneered in Xinjiang during the two campaigns in order to strengthen the party’s control and visibility at the grass roots by requiring every neighbourhood and village to be co-managed by party officials, police officers and external Fanghuiju work teams.

‘Trinity’ mechanism

(两告知一宣讲) 
A term used to refer to an extrajudicial ‘trial’ of re-education camp detainees, at which party-state officials inform detainees how the detainees participated in illegal terrorist and extremist activities, while also lecturing them on the party’s policy of lenient treatment according to law.

Two announcements, one lecture

(两面人) 
A phrase initially used during the Cultural Revolution and resurrected under Xi Jinping to refer to people (chiefly officials) who praise the party’s policies in public while seeking to undermine them in private. During the strike-hard and re-education campaigns in Xinjiang, the term was repeatedly used to criticise Uyghur officials who were perceived to be disloyal.

Two-faced person

Two-faced people

A massive 52-gigabyte database used by police and other Chinese officials in the regional capital of Ürümqi that was leaked to journalist Yael Grauer and verified by The Intercept news organisation. The database includes weekly police reports outlining ongoing investigations, surveillance operations and detention decisions about Uyghurs and other minorities living in the jurisdiction.

Ürümqi Police Records

(村民委员会) 
The lowest tier of administrative governance in rural China, which is legally a self-governing and self-elected body created to oversee service provision in the community but is ultimately controlled by grassroots party officials responsible for also maintaining social stability and harmony in their local jurisdictions.

Village Committee

(援疆) 
A national program, officially known as the ‘pairing-assistance Xinjiang aid scheme’ (对口支援新疆), initiated in 2010 to mobilise resources to aid the development and transformation of Xinjiang. Through this program, 19 cities and provinces in central and coastal China have been assigned counterpart jurisdictions in Xinjiang, where they provide financial and security assistance, infrastructure investment, employment, educational and other forms of support.

Xinjiang Aid

Xinjiang Communist Youth League Committee

共产主义青年团委员会 (共青团委)

 中央维护稳定工作领导小组 & 办公室

Central Stability Maintenance Leading Small Group & Office

深入推进“去极端化”工作领导小组

Advancing "De-extremification" Work Leading Small Group

“民族团结一家亲”活动领导小组

Prefecture/County Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Command

State Administration for Market Regulation

南疆四地州深度贫困地区有组织转移就业工作领导小组

Systematic Labour Transfers from Poverty-Stricken Areas of Southern Xinjiang Leading Small Group

职业技能教育培训中心 (教培中心)

中央新疆工作协调小组 & 中央新疆办

Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group & Central Xinjiang Office

Prefecture/County National Security Commission

国有资产监督管理委员会 (国资委)

State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)

国家反恐怖工作领导小组 & 国家反恐办

National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group & National Counterterrorism Office

Xinjiang Commission for Discipline Inspection / Supervisory Commission

Central United Front Work Department (UFWD)

Xinjiang Counterterrorism Leading Small Group

"De-extremification" Legislative Leading Small Group

Prefecture/County Poverty Alleviation and Development Office

Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security

自治区维护稳定工作领导小组 & 办公室

Xinjiang Stability Maintenance Leading Small Group & Office

Prefecture/County Public Security Bureau (PSB)

Prefecture/County Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC)

 国家互联网信息办公室 (国信办)

Xinjiang Department  of State Security (MSS)

中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室 (网信办)

Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC)

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

Xinjiang PLAC's Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Command

自治区综合治理办公室 (综治办)

Prefecture/County Stability Maintenance Leading Small Group

Vocational Education and Training Leading Small Group

Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development

Prefecture/County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau

Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC)

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)

National Administration of State Secrets Protection

Township United Front Work Department (UFWD)

Neighbourhood (Village) Police Substation

Xinjiang United Front Work Department (UFWD)

Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC)

Prefecture/County United Front Work Department (UFWD)

Prefecture/County Commission for Discipline Inspection / Supervisory Commission

Prefecture/County Organisation Department

Village Cyberspace Affairs Station (CCAC)

Xinjiang Bureau of State Secrets Protection

Prefecture/County Office of the Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC)

National Religious Affairs Administration

Township Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC)

Prefecture/County Culture and Tourism Office

Prefecture/County Administration for Market Regulation Bureau

Prefecture/County Industry and Information Technology Bureau

Prefecture/County People’s Procuratorate

Prefecture/County Human Resources and Social Security Bureau

地/县国有资产监督管理委员会 (国资委)

Prefecture/County State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)

Prefecture/County Development and Reform Commission

Prefecture/County Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau

Prefecture/County Communist Youth League Committee

Neighbourhood Committee & Neighbourhood Party Committee

Xinjiang Department of Culture and Tourism

Xinjiang Administration for Market Regulation

自治区国有资产监督管理委员会 (自治区国资委)

Xinjiang State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)

Xinjiang Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development

Xinjiang Department of Industry and Information Technology

Xinjiang Department of Human Resources and Social Security

Xinjiang Development and Reform Commission

Central Committee for the Comprehensive Governance of Social Order & Office

Township Communist Youth League Committee

Prefecture/County State Security Bureau (MSS)

National Radio and Television Administration

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

Xinjiang Radio and Television Administration

自治区扶贫开发办公室 (扶贫办)

Xinjiang Poverty Alleviation and Development Office

职业技能教育培训服务管理局 (教培局)

Vocational Education and Training Service Management Bureau (Re-education Bureau)

Xinjiang "De-extremification" Propaganda Lecture Group

“Fanghuiju” Leading Small Group & Office

违法生育专项治理行动领导小组

Targeted Crackdown on Illegal Births Leading Small Group

Village-based Mosque Management Committee

Prefecture/County Bureau of State Secrets Protection

民族团结一家亲办公室 (一家亲办)

Office of the Central Secrets Protection Committee

Township Office of the Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC)

Prefecture/County Comprehensive Management Office

国家发展和改革委员会 (发改委)

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)

National Administration for Rural Revitalisation

Xinjiang Office of the Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC)

Prefecture/county People's Armed Police (PAP)

Across China, the propaganda organs at all levels monitor, guide and manipulate public opinion by disseminating party-approved messages while censoring the news and social media.[1](https://archive.ph/jB7dw)

In Xinjiang, propaganda is omnipresent. Citizens (including officials) are bombarded with propaganda lectures (宣讲) and positive media coverage of the Counterterrorism and Re-education campaigns, and are compelled to actively participate in the production and consumption of propaganda material.

Image source[2](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21079974-ba-chu-zhen-zhao-kai-da-xuan-jiang-da-jie-pi-da-sheng-tao-da-fan-si-huo-dong-ji-fa-sheng-liang-jian-da-hui-xian-chang-tui-jin-hui-screencapture-mp-weixin-qq-s-2021-10-06-02_12_47)

Public propaganda lectures in Xinjiang are a form of political theatre in which participants are required to act out and embody their loyalty to the party.

In large mass gatherings, officials and ordinary citizens give speeches condemning the evils of religious extremism and praising the party and its policies.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983360-zhang-chun-xian-zai-zi-zhi-qu-ji-ceng-xuan-chuan-gong-zuo-ji-dong-ji-da-xuan-jiang-dong-yuan-hui-yi-shang-yao-qiu-zuo-zheng-zhi-jian-ding-de-yin-ling-zhe-gan-jiang-hui-jiang-de-zhan-dou-yuan-ge-zu-qun-zhong-de-tie-xin-ren) [2](https://archive.ph/csVKf)

Officials say these events are intended as ‘“brainstorming” sessions for curing the disease and eliminating the illness’ (一场治疾去疴的’头脑风暴’) of religious extremism.[3](https://archive.ph/YahfV)

These gatherings are frequently accompanied by flag-raising ceremonies,[4](https://archive.ph/56Xu6) public condemnation of two-faced people (两面人)[5](https://archive.ph/ZBNiM) and calls for the public to inform on such people living in their community.[6](https://archive.ph/Os0IB)

Image source[7](https://freewechat.com/a/MzAxMDc3MTM5OA==/2653722369/1)

In 2014, under instructions of then Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian (张春贤), the Propaganda Department prepared lecture outlines and hand-picked propaganda lecture groups (宣讲团).[1](https://archive.ph/WIUNx)

The lecture groups typically include party officials, law enforcement officers, religious leaders, teachers, former detainees and psychologists,[2](https://archive.ph/YahfV) as well ordinary citizens who are known as ‘grassroots propaganda lecturers’ (草根宣讲员).[3](https://archive.ph/5xbea) [4](https://archive.ph/T7aIl)

The groups often spend weeks or months touring local villages and townships,[5](https://archive.ph/T7aIl) [6](https://archive.ph/pmw3B) speaking at schools or stadiums to thousands or tens of thousands of residents at a time.[7](https://archive.ph/cHUba) [8](https://archive.ph/YahfV)

Image source[9](https://archive.ph/ggTgq)

Throughout the Re-education Campaign, the Justice Department played a leading role in mobilising and organising propaganda lecture groups,[1](https://archive.ph/YahfV) [2](https://archive.ph/cHUba) [3](https://archive.ph/dOy5Q) [4](https://archive.ph/cve3w) primarily through its ‘Propaganda Lecture Office to Promote Harmony and Prevent Crimes’ (促进和谐预防犯罪宣讲办公室).[5](https://archive.ph/YahfV) [6](https://archive.ph/cHUba) [7](https://archive.ph/dOy5Q)

This office is headed by Abduwayit Seydiwaqqas (阿布都瓦依提·赛迪瓦卡斯), a former prison bureaucrat and now star propaganda lecturer who travels throughout Xinjiang giving lectures and training other propaganda lecturers.[8](https://archive.ph/idjxq) [9](https://archive.ph/JkvPs) [10](https://archive.ph/mdIjt)

Image source[11](https://archive.ph/zquAa)

At the local level, smaller scale propaganda lectures are organised by Fanghuiju work teams, village-based mosque management offices[1](https://archive.ph/Hbl8D) and the neighbourhood or village committees.[2](https://archive.ph/SdROD) [3](https://archive.ph/00mMa) 

Between 2015 and 2020, 12,000 Fanghuiju work teams and 1.1 million Becoming Family officials reportedly went into people’s homes in southern Xinjiang to deliver de-extremification propaganda lectures.[4](https://archive.ph/SW5Bq)

Image source[5](https://freewechat.com/a/MzA4NTMzOTE2MA==/2650115068/5)

Another element of Xinjiang’s propaganda barrage are large public ceremonies called ‘speaking up and brandishing the sword’ (发声亮剑), where officials and civilians pledge loyalty to the party and declare war against extremism and two-faced people.[1](https://archive.ph/GeqXA) [2](https://archive.is/z2u6w) 

Participants typically sign their names on a massive propaganda banner and ‘solemnly promise to be grateful to the party, listen to the party, and follow the party’.[3](https://archive.ph/HN61W) [4](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21013473-gong-liu-bai-yu-ming-ge-zu-fu-nu-fa-sheng-liang-jian-sai-wai-jiang-nan-xin-jiang-yi-li)

These events are often photographed and recorded, and then publicised widely. The ceremonies are organised by government offices such as the procuratorate or the court,[5](https://archive.ph/WcWMf) [6](https://archive.ph/soYj7) [7](https://archive.ph/h8Pa8) [8](https://archive.ph/GJuzN) neighbourhood and village committees, local women’s federations,[9](https://archive.ph/u5LQ8) [10](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805402-xin-jiang-nan-jiang-di-qu-ji-ceng-fan-kong-wei-wen-ji-zhi-yan-jiu) private businesses and residential units.[11](https://archive.ph/qRNct) [12](https://archive.ph/6aOfk)

Image source[13](https://archive.ph/GeqXA)

A number of other government departments have contributed to Xinjiang’s propaganda campaigns, including the following:

- The Xinjiang Radio and Television Administration (广播电视总局) produces government-approved television programs. Xinjiang residents are then compelled to consume such content in public and private settings.[1](https://archive.is/Vb5fE)

- The Xinjiang Propaganda Department (宣传部) organises media tours for reporters to produce positive coverage of the Re-education Campaign.[2](https://archive.ph/JPH30) Under the department’s supervision are think tanks such as the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences (社会科学院), which defends the party’s policies while dismissing accusations of repression or genocide.[3](https://archive.is/x02yc) [4](https://archive.is/RRCqf)

- The Xinjiang Cyberspace Affairs Commission (网信委) runs more than a hundred accounts on WeChat for propaganda purposes. By 2016, those accounts had reportedly accumulated 6.8 million followers.[5](https://archive.ph/MiH5X)

- The Xinjiang Law Society (法学会) reportedly distributed more than 1.17 million pieces of law-related propaganda material in 2017.[6](https://archive.ph/NbmWV)

- The Xinjiang Transportation Department (交通运输局) promised to turn bus stations into propaganda stations and transportation staff into volunteer propaganda lecturers (义务宣讲员).[7](https://archive.ph/pcBps)

Image source[8](https://freewechat.com/a/MzAxMDc3MTM5OA==/2653722369/1)

Propaganda

In February 2014, the Xinjiang Party Committee announced that, over the next three years, it would send down 200,000 cadres to reside and work in local communities and villages in a program named Fanghuiju (访惠聚).[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20893110-xin-jiang-_fang-hui-ju-_shu-ping-tui-jin-chang-zhi-jiu-an-de-zhong-da-zhi-ben-zhi-ce) 

In Chinese, Fanghuiju is shorthand for ‘Visit the people, benefit the people, and link the hearts of the people’ (访民情、惠民生、聚民心). In January 2018, the Xinjiang Party Committee under Chen Quanguo (陈全国) announced that the program would be extended indefinitely.[2](http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xinjiang/xjyw/201801/36579846391f409bb29a3ab6dcd4e5ac.shtml)

Under the Fanghuiju Program, work teams of trusted (chiefly Han) party and government cadres are sent to work in local (chiefly minority) communities, where they are tasked with safeguarding social stability and strengthening party capacity at the grassroots level.[3](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region) 

The work teams are required to closely monitor, interview and report on families that are perceived to pose a threat to social stability, and help local party committees to carry out remedial ‘transformation through education’ (教育转化) work, including possible detention within a re-education camp.[4](https://archive.ph/NR2J5) [5](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region) [6](https://archive.is/iyswq) [7](https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang) [8](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621529?journalCode=cjcc20)

Image source[9](https://freewechat.com/a/MzA5MDc1NDA1Mg==/2651369833/1)

In Xinjiang, Fanghuiju offices have been created at various administrative levels[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20893110-xin-jiang-_fang-hui-ju-_shu-ping-tui-jin-chang-zhi-jiu-an-de-zhong-da-zhi-ben-zhi-ce) under the Organisation Department (组织部).[2](https://archive.ph/QNm4k) [3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983353-20200930214009150r1lpbx-1)

Since 2017, Xinjiang’s Party Secretary, Chen Quanguo, has personally headed the regional Fanghuiju Taskforce;[4](https://archive.ph/NR2J5) the head of the Organisation Department, Ma Xuejun (马学军), leads the corresponding Fanghuiju Office.[5](https://archive.ph/QNm4k)

Following the launch of the program, Xinjiang’s Organisation Department published several Fanghuiju handbooks in 2015,[6](https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/chinese-sources/cadre-materials/cadre-handbooks/) which clarified how to deal with potential issues that participants might encounter, such as what to do when a family refuses to let officials inside their home or how to interact with the family members of detainees.[7](https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/chinese-sources/cadre-materials/cadre-handbooks/)

In 2016, Xinjiang’s Fanghuiju Office included officials from the United Front Work Department (统战部), the Propaganda Department (宣传部), the Party School (党校), Xinjiang’s Women’s Federation (妇女联合会) and Xinjiang’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委).[8](http://archive.today/IUY3y)

In 2017, Xinjiang’s Development and Reform Commission (发展和改革委员会) developed an information management system (管理信息系统) to improve the efficiency of the Fanghuiju Program.[9](https://archive.ph/FF9Qj)

Image source[10](https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/chinese-sources/cadre-materials/cadre-handbooks/)

In October 2016, the Xinjiang Party Committee (党委) initiated an effort related to the Fanghuiju Program called the Becoming Family (民族团结一家亲) Initiative.[1](https://archive.ph/bKcY5) 

It required over a million (chiefly Han) party cadres, government officials and managers at state-owned companies in Xinjiang to ‘become family’ with 1.6 million (chiefly Uyghur) ‘relatives’ so that they could ‘eat, live, work, and study together’ for periods of time. From 2018, they have been required to spend at least five days together once every two months.[2](https://archive.ph/aZ6TW) [3](https://archive.md/bKcY5) [4](https://archive.is/HS9OI)

Although the Becoming Family Taskforce and offices falls under the United Front Work Department,[5](http://archive.ph/ewur4) [6](https://archive.ph/z0dHu) [7](https://archive.ph/3GWSb) [8](https://archive.ph/fsW4a) the Becoming Family campaign in practice is an extension of and has now merged with the Fanghuiju Program.[9](https://archive.ph/ypDuh) [10](https://archive.ph/QWMpE)

Image source[11](https://web.archive.org/web/20200918190431/https:/www.meipian.cn/295uiimr?first_share_uid=1000&share_user_mpuuid=3956109775e7c895a139be693e48edb8&share_depth=1&first_share_to=other&v=6.2.3&user_id=1000&share_from=others&uuid=51a0173efffa4fe3a2d3616f1c9e3323&isappinstalled=1&idfa=B18B5F85-3D8F-4D08-8254-11137476313E)

Almost every government department and state-owned enterprise in Xinjiang has cadres participating in the Fanghuiju Program, including those that normally have nothing to do with surveillance or ethnic policy, such as the Department of Housing and Rural–Urban Development (住房和城乡建设厅),[1](http://web.archive.org/web/20210127035500/http://zjt.xinjiang.gov.cn/xjjs/zxdt/201604/046271c8415c44afae67e5b4fd9b6c38.shtml) the Agricultural Machinery Bureau (农牧业机械管理局),[2](https://archive.vn/GjQvz) the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau (人力资源和社会保障局)[3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983354-gao-wei-tui-dong-tong-li-xie-zuo-ke-shi-di-qu-dong-ji-qing-nian-jiao-yu-pei-xun-gong-zuo-ru-huo-ru-tu-_-zi-you-wei-xin) [4](http://archive.today/vuuOl) [5](http://archive.today/Azj4b) [6](http://archive.today/C7XYv) and the Industry and Information Technology Bureau (工业和信息化局).[7](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21011486-kui-tun-shi-zhao-kai-zhi-hui-fu-neng-jue-sheng-wei-lai-di-er-jie-zhi-hui-cheng-shi-guan) [8](http://archive.today/lygXJ)

Cadres who participate in the Fanghuiju Program call themselves ‘big brothers’ and ‘big sisters’ of Uyghurs and other minority groups, as they eat and sleep with local families, and feed and tutor their children.[9](https://archive.is/2iJkv) [10](https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang) Simultaneously, they monitor their adopted families, assessing their level of political loyalty, and note down signs that their attachment to Islam might be ‘extreme’.[11](https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang) [12](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621529?journalCode=cjcc20)

Image source[13](https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/chinese-sources/cadre-materials/cadre-handbooks/)

Fanghuiju Program

Re-education camps are extrajudicial detention facilities in Xinjiang where Uyghurs and other minority groups undergo political indoctrination under tight security and hard conditions. Some former detainees say they suffered torture and sexual abuse.[1](https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/china-cables-who-are-the-uighurs-and-why-mass-detention/) 

It’s widely accepted that between several hundred thousand and 1 million Uyghurs have been detained in the camps without legal recourse since early 2017.[2](https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figure-detentions-xinjiangs-camps-come)

The Chinese Government calls these facilities ‘vocational education and training centres’ (职业技能培训中心),[3](https://archive.is/NeilS) while international scholars and journalists refer to them as internment,[4](https://archive.is/9jELb) detention,[5](https://archive.is/uoW7B) re-education[6](https://archive.is/xgebS) or concentration camps.[7](https://archive.ph/RfcD4)

Image source[8](https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/map/)

The decision to send an individual to a re-education camp appears to hinge on their local Neighbourhood Committee (社区居民委员会) or its rural equivalent, the Village Committee (村民委员会), which have turned into quasi-intelligence and policing bodies under Xinjiang’s ‘Trinity’ Mechanism (三位一体机制).

According to leaked police reports from the regional capital of Ürümqi, this is how an urban resident may end up in a camp: (see next slide)

Image source[1](https://web.archive.org/web/20200918190431/https:/www.meipian.cn/295uiimr?first_share_uid=1000&share_user_mpuuid=3956109775e7c895a139be693e48edb8&share_depth=1&first_share_to=other&v=6.2.3&user_id=1000&share_from=others&uuid=51a0173efffa4fe3a2d3616f1c9e3323&isappinstalled=1&idfa=B18B5F85-3D8F-4D08-8254-11137476313E)

An individual is flagged by a surveillance system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)  for actions perceived to be suspicious.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048042-report2064) [2](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048043-report1891)

The Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委), which operates the IJOP system, then notifies the Neighbourhood Committee, which administers local communities and their residents. 

Ürümqi’s police records reveal that via this predictive policing system, the PLAC sends a push notification of ‘micro clues’ (微线索)[3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048054-report1087) to the neighborhood committee and police when irregularities are detected: someone having an unexpected visitor at home, driving a car that doesn’t belong to oneself,[4](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048042-report2064) [5](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048043-report1891) receiving an overseas phone call[6](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/china-big-data-program-targets-xinjiangs-muslims) or using file sharing apps like Zapya.[7](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558507-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-Chinese.html) 

In police reports, these often innocuous acts are described as ‘enemy movements’ (敌情)[8](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048042-report2064) or ‘important intelligence’ (重要情报).[9](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048043-report1891)

Image source: ASPI  

After some form of investigation, the Neighbourhood Committee holds an evaluation meeting (研判会) to decide whether the flagged individual should be sent away for re-education.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048046-report1760%5D)

The evaluation meeting also takes into account other forms of intelligence, such as reports by Fanghuiju teams who flag residents for, among other activities, having a copy of the Quran in their home, praying on Friday or refusing to watch television.[2](https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang)

It’s unclear what happens immediately after an evaluation meeting. Leaked police records show that, in many cases, a sentencing hearing takes place after an individual has been held at a camp for months,[3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048052-report1622) or even years.[4](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048058-report329) 

One document shows that officials from the Procuratorate (人民检察院) are present at these hearings.[5](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048052-report1622)

Image source[6](https://web.archive.org/web/20200918190431/https:/www.meipian.cn/295uiimr?first_share_uid=1000&share_user_mpuuid=3956109775e7c895a139be693e48edb8&share_depth=1&first_share_to=other&v=6.2.3&user_id=1000&share_from=others&uuid=51a0173efffa4fe3a2d3616f1c9e3323&isappinstalled=1&idfa=B18B5F85-3D8F-4D08-8254-11137476313E)

Since 2018, re-education camps have been formally managed by ‘vocational education and training service management bureaus’ (职业技能教育培训服务管理局) across Xinjiang.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20893077-china-cables-telegram-chinese-1) [2](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983350-201812230401050-1) [3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983351-20190102201211839) 

The bureaus are set up by a coordinating taskforce within each prefecture or county. The taskforce is headed by the local party secretary and includes bureaucrats from the Public Security Bureau (公安局), Justice Bureau (司法局), Education Bureau (教育局) and Health Commission (卫生健康委员会).[4](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20893077-china-cables-telegram-chinese-1)

In Kelpin County (柯坪县), 31 staff members from the Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Command (反恐维稳指挥部) under the local Political and Legal Affairs Commission work in the control room for the county’s re-education camps.[5](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983352-201910101734014875f8zt9-1) According to the committee’s 2018 budget document, these staff members are dressed in military fatigues.[6](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983352-201910101734014875f8zt9-1)

Image source[7](https://web.archive.org/web/20200222092853/http://www.visionstar-tech.com/Content/index/id/665)

Re-education camp detainees are required to take classes and pass tests on a variety of subjects, including political ideology and Chinese. 

Local education bureaus draw up test papers and record detainees’ test results, and the test scores are one of the main criteria for the release of detainees.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20893077-china-cables-telegram-chinese-1)

According to an official document from Karamay City (克拉玛依市), its Human Resources and Social Security Bureau (人力资源和社会保障局) handles the paperwork (脱培手续办理) when a detainee is released from a re-education camp.[2](https://archive.vn/UcPMb) 

In Pichan County (鄯善县), the Justice Bureau (司法局) pays for the detainees’ food and living expenses.[3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983351-20190102201211839)

Image source[4](https://web.archive.org/web/20200918190431/https:/www.meipian.cn/295uiimr?first_share_uid=1000&share_user_mpuuid=3956109775e7c895a139be693e48edb8&share_depth=1&first_share_to=other&v=6.2.3&user_id=1000&share_from=others&uuid=51a0173efffa4fe3a2d3616f1c9e3323&isappinstalled=1&idfa=B18B5F85-3D8F-4D08-8254-11137476313E)

The regional-level Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委), Public Security Department (公安局), Justice Department (司法局) and Ethnic Affairs Commission (民宗委) helped draft a set of ‘de-extremification’ regulations beginning in 2015.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805384-maimaitiaili-tuersun_zi-zhi-qu-qu-ji-duan-hua-tiao-li-dan-sheng-ji) 

Following central approvals, the Xinjiang De-extremification Regulations (新疆去极端化条例) were enacted on 29 March 2017, only to be amended in October 2018 to retrospectively provide a legal basis for the detention of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang’s re-education camps.[2](https://archive.is/Y6LWO) [3](https://archive.is/NPGxm) [4](https://archive.is/5pU3o)

Image source[5](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805384-maimaitiaili-tuersun_zi-zhi-qu-qu-ji-duan-hua-tiao-li-dan-sheng-ji)

Re-education camps

Coercive labour transfers are a key aspect of Xinjiang’s Re-education Campaign. 

Uyghurs and other minority people in rural parts of southern Xinjiang are commonly referred to as surplus labour (富余劳动力) or poverty-stricken labour (贫困劳动力) by government officials, and are assigned mandatory job assignments throughout Xinjiang or elsewhere in China in the name of poverty alleviation.[1](https://archive.is/l0Ean) [2](https://archive.is/ywAiH) [3](https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Coercive-Labor-and-Forced-Displacement-in-Xinjiangs-Cross-Regional-Labor-Transfers-A-Process-Oriented-Evaluation.pdf?x32203) [4](https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:d360ffab-40cc-4d83-8b8b-a8bd503286a3#pageNum=25)

During their work assignments, Islamic and cultural practices, such as wearing a headscarf, are forbidden, and workers are required to undergo Chinese, legal and patriotic studies in their spare time.[5](https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Coercive-Labor-and-Forced-Displacement-in-Xinjiangs-Cross-Regional-Labor-Transfers-A-Process-Oriented-Evaluation.pdf?x32203) [6](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale) 

ASPI’s previous report, *Uyghurs for sale*, investigated these labour transfers and argued that they’re indicative of forced labour.[7](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale)

In 2017, state media reported that not a single villager in a remote part of Guma County (皮山县) would voluntarily sign up to a labour transfer scheme until party officials visited individual homes to pressure people into taking part.[8](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56250915)

Image source[9](http://archive.ph/KDEBd)

Transferred workers are typically between 18 and 40 years old,[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983355-xin-jiang-ni-le-ke-duo-cuo-bing-ju-tan-suo-ti-sheng-nong-cun-lao-dong-li-jiang-wai-you-zu-zhi-zhuan-yi-jiu-ye-xin-mo-shi) [2](https://archive.ph/bDnMZ) and many leave children, elderly relatives and livestock behind. In Kargilik County (叶城县), 2,428 elderly residents, 1,941 children, and some 336,900 animals were placed under state care following job assignments.[3](https://archive.ph/T14o2) 

It’s likely that the local education bureau (教育局) is responsible for overseeing the county’s 281 nurseries (托幼所).[4](https://archive.ph/bDnMZ) [5](https://archive.ph/T14o2)

Image source[6](https://archive.ph/K2yNY%23selection-49.25-50.0)

Transferred workers aren’t allowed to leave their work assignments or go home without the approval of both the county and prefectural level labour transfer taskforces.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983356-guan-yu-jin-yi-bu-ti-gao-nan-jiang-si-di-zhou-shen-du-pin-kun-di-qu-you-zu-zhi-zhuan-yi-lao-dong-li-jiu-ye-wen-ding-xing-gong-zuo-de-tong-zhi) 

Any abnormal circumstances (异常情况) related to the workers’ conduct are reported to the county-level Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委员会), Public Security Bureau (公安局) and the labour transfer taskforce, according to a government memo from Karashahar Hui Autonomous County (焉耆回族自治县).[2](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983356-guan-yu-jin-yi-bu-ti-gao-nan-jiang-si-di-zhou-shen-du-pin-kun-di-qu-you-zu-zhi-zhuan-yi-lao-dong-li-jiu-ye-wen-ding-xing-gong-zuo-de-tong-zhi)

Transferred workers are under the dual control (双向管控) of their new workplace and its local Neighbourhood Committee. Their comings and goings must be carefully recorded and they must participate in weekly flag-raising ceremonies, pledge their loyalty to the Party and accept ‘thought transformation’ (思想转化).[3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21048060-report6)

Image source[4](https://archive.ph/K2yNY)

Xinjiang’s Department of Human Resources and Social Security (自治区人力资源和社会保障厅) is directly in charge of job assignments. 

The department provides free training to poverty-stricken labourers,[1](https://archive.ph/MfzjP) gives subsidies to participating companies, employs bilingual minders to monitor minority workers, and runs a surveillance system called the ‘rural labourer job transfer management system’ (农村劳动力转移就业管理系统), which tracks the workers in real time.[2](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805395-xin-jiang-zi-zhi-qu-ren-li-zi-yuan-he-she-hui-bao-zhang-ting-qiang-hua-qu-nei-lao-wu-xie-zuo-cu-jin-chang-qi-wen-ding-jiu-ye) [3](https://archive.ph/T14o2) [4](https://archive.ph/6S8h4)

The department is responsible for drawing up plans to transfer workers,[5](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805395-xin-jiang-zi-zhi-qu-ren-li-zi-yuan-he-she-hui-bao-zhang-ting-qiang-hua-qu-nei-lao-wu-xie-zuo-cu-jin-chang-qi-wen-ding-jiu-ye) and for working with the Finance Department (自治区财政厅) to come up with incentives for companies[6](https://archive.md/nEogp) to help meet the government’s ambitious goal of 2.2 million transferred workers per year on average between 2016 and 2020. [7](https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:d360ffab-40cc-4d83-8b8b-a8bd503286a3#pageNum=17)

These acts of job creation have often displaced Uyghurs and other indigenous populations from their homeland, tearing communities and families apart.[8](https://jamestown.org/product/coercive-labor-and-forced-displacement-in-xinjiangs-cross-regional-labor-transfer-program/)

Image source: ASPI

A labour transfer taskforce known as the Systematic Labour Transfers from Poverty-Stricken Areas of Southern Xinjiang Leading Small Group (南疆四地州深度贫困地区有组织转移就业工作领导小组) was created in late 2018 at the regional level and is headed by the head of the Xinjiang Organisation Department (组织部).[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805395-xin-jiang-zi-zhi-qu-ren-li-zi-yuan-he-she-hui-bao-zhang-ting-qiang-hua-qu-nei-lao-wu-xie-zuo-cu-jin-chang-qi-wen-ding-jiu-ye) [2](https://archive.ph/TY9NH) 

Local branches of this taskforce are typically led by the local party or government leaders[3](https://documentcloud.org/documents/20983355-xin-jiang-ni-le-ke-duo-cuo-bing-ju-tan-suo-ti-sheng-nong-cun-lao-dong-li-jiang-wai-you-zu-zhi-zhuan-yi-jiu-ye-xin-mo-shi) [4](https://archive.ph/hSJYU) and are coordinated by the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau.[5](https://archive.fo/cvj1N) [6](https://archive.md/hSJYU)

A 2017 government memo from the Yizhou District (伊州区) in Hami City (哈密市) states that its labour transfer taskforce assigned transfer quotas to its member departments.[7](https://archive.ph/bDnMZ) Another government press release says that a quota was imposed on every official in Nilka County (尼勒克县).[8](https://documentcloud.org/documents/20983355-xin-jiang-ni-le-ke-duo-cuo-bing-ju-tan-suo-ti-sheng-nong-cun-lao-dong-li-jiang-wai-you-zu-zhi-zhuan-yi-jiu-ye-xin-mo-shi)

Image source[9](https://archive.ph/K2yNY)


A number of other departments—many of which are part of the labour transfer taskforce—are responsible for fixing jobs (落实岗位) for Uyghurs and other indigenous people in their particular industries:[1](https://archive.ph/bDnMZ) [2](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805395-xin-jiang-zi-zhi-qu-ren-li-zi-yuan-he-she-hui-bao-zhang-ting-qiang-hua-qu-nei-lao-wu-xie-zuo-cu-jin-chang-qi-wen-ding-jiu-ye)

- The Xinjiang Development and Reform Commission (发展和改革委员会) facilitates transfers of workers to fixed-asset investment projects (固定资产项目), which include infrastructure construction and other state-owned projects.[3](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20983356-guan-yu-jin-yi-bu-ti-gao-nan-jiang-si-di-zhou-shen-du-pin-kun-di-qu-you-zu-zhi-zhuan-yi-lao-dong-li-jiu-ye-wen-ding-xing-gong-zuo-de-tong-zhi) [4](https://archive.ph/qbsym)

- The Xinjiang State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (国有资产监督管理委员会) facilitated the transfer of 16,000 poverty-stricken labourers to state-owned enterprises between 2017 and 2019.[5](https://archive.ph/1AINE)

- The Xinjiang Department of Industry and Information Technology (自治区工业和信息化厅) facilitates transfers of workers to the textile, garment, agricultural and electronics manufacturing sectors.[6](https://archive.ph/WRXAY) [7](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805413-bu-wang-chu-xin-lao-ji-shi-ming-zhuan-yi-jiu-ye-rang-ri-zi-yue-lai-yue-mei-hao-screencapture-snapshot-sogoucdn-websnapshot-2021-05-05-21_58_50) [8](http://archive.ph/lygXJ) [9](https://archive.ph/JQdg5) [10](https://archive.ph/FAgO1) [11](https://archive.is/dyzyK) [12](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20893084-zhou-yuan-jiang-feng-cai-lu-2chan-ye-yuan-jiang-cu-fa-zhan-zeng-tian-dong-li-hui-min-sheng)

- The Department of Housing and Urban–Rural Development (自治区住房和城乡建设厅) facilitates transfers of workers to the construction sector.[13](https://archive.ph/Z9Vzo) [14](https://archive.ph/7Xisq)

- The Xinjiang Poverty Alleviation and Development Office (自治区扶贫开发办公室pcoordinates with the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (中华全国工商业联合会) to bring private enterprises to southern Xinjiang in preparation for job transfers.[15](https://archive.ph/odIMX)

Other government and party agencies are also tangentially involved in coercive labour transfers. In 2019, the Women’s Federation (妇联) in Keriye County (于田县) sent 50 women to work at an electronics factory in Qingdao (青岛市), Shandong, and 500 women to Urumqi (乌鲁木齐市) to work in housekeeping and catering services.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21051306-yu-tian-xian-tui-jin-fu-nu-lao-wu-shu-chu-zhuan-yi-jiu-ye-gong-zuo-yu-tian-zheng-fu-wang)

Fanghuiju work teams have also visited homes and conducted unspecified investigations in an attempt to persuade Uyghurs and other groups to take up job assignments.[2](https://archive.ph/mieBZ)

Image source[3](http://archive.ph/M0CKg)

Coercive labour transfers

Beginning in April 2017, authorities in Xinjiang launched a series of crackdowns on ‘illegal births’ (违法生育) aimed at curbing the birthrate among Uyghur and other minority women.[1](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang) [2](https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c) [3](https://jamestown.org/product/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birthrates-in-xinjiang/)

Authorities imposed coercive birth-control measures such as hefty fines, disciplinary punishment, internment and mandatory sterilisation on women who had violated Xinjiang’s Population and Family Planning Regulations (计划生育政策), which were revised in July 2017 to eliminate previous preferential births for Uyghur and other minority women.[4](https://archive.is/dRQ7r) [5](https://web.archive.org/web/20210913063223/https://www.guancha.cn/local/2017_07_31_420667_2.shtml)

Family-planning officials in Xinjiang are now told to ensure the early detection and early handling (早发现早处置) of those found in violation of the regulations and to visit women of childbearing age ever month and conduct quarterly pregnancy checks.[6](https://archive.fo/7wyhZ)

Image source[7](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang)

‘Illegal births’ by Uyghur and other minority women that occurred as far back as 1992 are retrospectively punished.[1](https://archive.is/qXHml) [2](https://archive.ph/iGaGS) 

These strict population control measures for Uyghurs are being carried out as Han families both inside Xinjiang and across China are being encouraged to have more children in response to a looming population crisis.[3](https://archive.is/0hXrb) [4](https://archive.is/2a2jD)

Between 2017 and 2019, birthrates in Xinjiang fell on average by 48.4%, while in counties where Uyghurs and other minority groups make up at least 90% of the population the birthrate dropped by an average of 56.5%.[5](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang)

Image source[6](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang)

The Xinjiang Health Commission (自治区卫生建康委员会) is responsible for implementing and enforcing the region’s family-planning policies. 

In 2020 alone, the commission spent RMB 140 million (US$22 million) decreasing birth rates and cracking down on ‘illegal births’ in southern Xinjiang.[1](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20805409-xin-jiang-wei-wu-er-zi-zhi-qu-wei-sheng-jian-kang-wei-yuan-hui-2020nian-du-bu-men-yu-suan-gong-kai-bao-gao)

Following 2017 and 2018 directives from the Xinjiang Health Commission on family-planning policy,[2](https://archive.is/84HtO) [3](https://archive.is/TKjX8) taskforces named ‘Targeted Crackdown on Illegal Births Leading Small Group’ (违法生育专项治理行动领导小组) were created at the prefecture,[4](https://archive.ph/vSK23) [5](https://archive.ph/dQMMU) county[6](https://archive.is/84HtO) and township levels, as well as inside government departments and companies.[7](https://archive.is/TKjX8)

The office of this taskforce is located within the Health Commission (卫生健康委员会), and its members include officials from the local government and Party Committee, Public Security Bureau (公安局), United Front Work Department (统战部), Propaganda Department (宣传部), Education Bureau (教育部), Women’s Federation (妇女联合会), Commission for Discipline Inspection (纪律检查委员会), Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (民宗委), Civil Affairs Bureau (民政局), Finance Bureau (财政局), Human Resources and Social Security Bureau (人力资源和社会保障局), Justice Bureau (司法局) and others.[8](https://archive.is/TKjX8) [9](https://archive.is/84HtO)

At the grassroots level, village and neighbourhood party secretaries, Fanghuiju work teams, family-planning clerks and grid-managers carry out the day-to-day crackdown on illegal births.[1](https://archive.ph/Y8WkK)

In Chapchal Xibo Autonomous County (察布查尔锡伯自治县), party officials instructed village leaders to make illegal births an important component in their daily evaluation meetings,[2](https://archive.ph/Y8WkK) which decide who is to be sent to a re-education camp. 

According to a leaked party document from Karakash County (墨玉县), one of the most frequently cited reason for internment was violations of family-planning regulations.[3](https://jamestown.org/product/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birthrates-in-xinjiang/) [4](https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/)

Image source[5](https://freewechat.com/a/MzA5MDc1NDA1Mg==/2651369027/3)

Effectively dealing with illegal births is now a key performance indicator for local officials.[1](https://archive.is/qXHml) For party and government officials, violating family-planning regulations is grounds for immediate demotion or dismissal.[2](https://archive.is/xwGCU)

The ‘optimisation’ (优化) of Xinjiang’s population structure not only involves reducing ‘low-quality’ (低素质) births by Uyghurs, but also concerted efforts to lure ‘high-quality’ (高素质) Han settlers and their families into the region.[3](https://archive.is/vZE5I) [4](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang)

In a 2017 Central Party Committee directive, the Han-dominated Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (兵团) was ordered to push south in order to increase the population base, urbanisation and industrial capacity of southern Xinjiang by the end of 2022.[5](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21063017-xin-jiang-nan-jiang-di-qu-cheng-zhen-hua-chan-ye-sheng-ji-yu-ren-kou-ji-ju)

Image source[6](https://archive.ph/Ks0Pt)

Population control

This chart maps the key bureaucratic offices involved in designing, coordinating and implementing the Chinese Communist Party’s policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in western China.
The chart does not include every single administrative organ; nor does it purport to be a comprehensive picture of the vast Chinese bureaucracy. Rather, it highlights those offices involved in either setting the policy direction or directly governing Xinjiang at various administrative levels. Each office includes explanatory text and links to authoritative sources highlighting the role of that organ in operationalising the party-state’s repressive policy in Xinjiang since 2014.
Please click on the offices in our chart to access the explanatory text and sourcing.
Through its interconnecting lines and vertical/horizontal layout, the chart illustrates key reporting lines and areas of political influence. We distinguish between party (党), state or government (政府), and hybrid offices (officially known as ‘leading small groups,’ 领导小组), but also note when party and government organs share the same office—what’s known in Chinese as ‘one office, two signs’ (一个机构两块牌子).
The crisscrossing nature of party, government and hybrid offices, the centralisation of political power under Xi Jinping and his insistence that the party must ‘lead everything’ (党是领导一切的) mean that a series of concentric and overlapping circles with Xi Jinping at the very centre might be a better visual representation of the Chinese bureaucracy at present. Yet in order to increase the chart’s readability and highlight the cross-hatching of horizontal and vertical lines of authority—what’s known in party-speak as the vertical reporting ‘lines’ (tiao 条) and the horizontal coordinating ‘pieces&#8216; (kuai 块) at various levels that define what Kenneth Lieberthal calls China’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ &#8211; we’ve adopted a more traditional organisational chart layout.
China’s bureaucratic landscape is constantly evolving. This chart maps administrative organs across the time period of the Counterterrorism and Re-education campaigns in Xinjiang, covering the roughly nine years since Xi Jinping became Party Secretary in November 2012, and notes when offices are no longer active. It seeks to illustrate the whole-of-system approach to manufacturing stability in Xinjiang and highlights the roles of individual bureaucratic organs in accomplishing that goal.
This chart was published on 19 October 2021.
Acknowledgments 
This chart and its associated report were created by researchers affiliated with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre and include Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, Daria Impiombato, Emile Dirks, Aston Kwok, Kate Wong*, Nyrola Elimä, Nathan Ruser and Kelsey Munro, with the assistance of Fergus Hanson and Danielle Cave. Kate Wong is a pseudonym due to safety considerations.
We would like to thank our peer reviewers who include Darren Byler, Timothy Grose, Sam Tynen, Samantha Hoffman, Peter Mattis, Michael Shoebridge and Edward Schwarck. Thank you to Yael Grauer, who shared access to the Ürümqi Police Records with ASPI. The opinions and analysis presented in this chart and report are those of the lead authors alone, who are also responsible for any errors or omissions.
The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office provided ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) with a grant of A$116,770 for this project, of which the associated research report is a key output. This project wouldn’t have been possible without 2020–21 funding from the US State Department, which supports the Xinjiang Data Project.

This chart maps the key bureaucratic offices involved in designing, coordinating and implementing the Chinese Communist Party’s policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China.